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PREDATORS OR PREY: MANDATORY 
LISTING OF NON-PREDATORY OFFENDERS 
ON PREDATORY OFFENDER REGISTRIES 
Marissa Ceglian* 
  
It is worthy to note that what separates our society from 
totalitarian states is that we take individual freedoms 
seriously and will not deprive citizens of those freedoms 
without strict adherence to the procedural requirements of 
the law.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Sexual offender registration statutes have existed in the United 
States since 1944.2 The primary impetus behind such statutes is to 
assist law enforcement in monitoring the movements and activities 
of convicted sexual offenders, should they pose any future threat to 
the community.3 Currently, all states have sex offender registration 
                                                          
 * Brooklyn Law School Class of 2005; B.A., Vassar College, 2001. The 
author would like to thank her parents, Nick and Chiara Ceglian, and Jeff Ratner 
for their continued support, encouragement and most importantly, for their 
patience. 
1 Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711, 721 (Minn. 1999) (Anderson, J., 
dissenting) (noting that the serious consequences of Minnesota’s predatory 
offender registration statute mandate that the defendant be accorded procedural 
due process protections). 
2 See Roxanne Lieb & Scott Matson, Sex Offender Registration: A Review 
of State Laws, WASHINGTON STATE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY (1996), at 
http://www.wspp.wa.gov/crime/pdf/regsrtn.pdf. California enacted its sex 
offender registration law in 1944, making it the first state to enact such 
legislation. Id. 
3 Klaas Kids Foundation, Megan’s Law By State, available at 
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statutes mandating that convicted sex offenders comply with 
certain registration requirements following their release from 
confinement.4 
                                                          
http://www.klaaskids.org/pglegmeg.htm [hereinafter Klaas Kids] (noting that 
sex offender registration laws are necessary because information contained in 
registries assists public agencies in protecting public safety) (last visited Feb. 11, 
2004). 
4 See Colleen Miles, Just Desserts, or a Rotten Apple? Will the Ninth 
Circuit’s Decision in Doe v. Otte Stand to Ensure that Convicted Sex Offenders 
Are Not Excessively Punished?, 32 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 45 (2002) (noting 
that “society has determined that released sex offenders are a class of offenders 
that must be watched closely by the community”). See ALA. CODE §§ 15-20-20 
to -38 (2003); ALASKA STAT. § 12.63.010, § 12.63.020, § 12.63.030 (Michie 
2003); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 13-3821 to -3827 (2004); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-
12-901 to -920 (Michie 2003); CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (Deering 2004); COLO. 
REV. STAT. §§ 16-22-101 to -114 (2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 54-250 to -261 
(2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 4120 (2004); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-4001 to -
4017 (2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.21 (West 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12 
(2002); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 846E-1 to 846E-9 (Michie 2003); IDAHO 
CODE §§ 18-8301 to -8326 (Michie 2003); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/1 to /12 
(2004); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 5-2-12-1 to -14 (2003); IOWA CODE §§ 692A.1 to 
.16 (2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-4901 to -4912 (2002); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 17.510, 17.520, 17.530, 17.578 (Michie 2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
15:540-549 (2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, §§ 11221 to 11228 (West 
2003); MD. CODE ANN. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 11-701- 11-721 (2003); 
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, §§ 178D-178Q (Law. Co-op. 2004); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS §§ 28.721 to .732 (2003); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 243.166 (West 2003); MISS. 
CODE ANN. §§ 45-33-21 to -57 (2004); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 589.400, 589.403, 
589.405, 589.407, 589.410, 589.414, 589.417, 589.420, 589.425 (2004); MONT. 
CODE ANN. §§ 46-23-501 to -513 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-4001 to -
4013 (2003); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 179D.460 (Michie 2004); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 651-B (2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to -19 (2004); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 29-11A-1 to -8 (Michie 2003); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168 
(Consol. 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-208.5, 14-208.6 to 14-208.6c (2004); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15 (2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2950.01 to .11 
(West 2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 57, §§ 581 to 589 (West 2003); OR. REV. 
STAT. §§ 181.592 to 181.607 (2001); 42 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. §§ 9791 to 9792, 
9795 to 9799 (West 2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37.1-1 to -20 (2003); S.C. 
CODE ANN. §§ 23-3-400 to 23-3-530 (2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-22-31 
to 22-22-41 (Michie 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-39-101 to 40-39-111 
(2003); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 62.01-62.14 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 77-27-21.5 (2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 5401 to 5414 (2003); VA. CODE 
ANN. §§ 9.1-900 to 9.1-920 (Michie 2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 
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Minnesota enacted its Predatory Offender Registration Statute 
in 1991 in response to the brutal gun-point abduction of eleven 
year-old Jacob Wetterling.5 As initially enacted, Minnesota’s 
statute required that persons convicted of certain enumerated child-
related offenses register as predatory offenders upon release from 
confinement.6 In 1993, the legislature amended the statute to 
expand the number of offenses that trigger registration.7 More 
significantly, the 1993 amendments mandated registration by 
individuals convicted of either an enumerated predatory offense or 
an offense “arising out of the same set of circumstances” if initially 
charged with an enumerated predatory offense.8 
                                                          
9A.44.130, 9A.44.135, 9A.44.140 (West 2004); W.VA. CODE §§ 15-12-1 to -10 
(2003); WIS. STAT. § 301.45 (2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-19-301 to 7-19-307 
(2003). 
5 MINN. STAT. § 243.166 (2003); Wayne A. Logan, Examining our 
Approaches to Sex Offenders and the Law: Jacob’s Legacy: Sex Offender 
Registration and Community Notification Laws, Practice, And Procedure in 
Minnesota, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1287, 1289-90 (2003) (noting that Jacob 
Wetterling, abducted in rural St. Joseph, Minnesota, has never been found and 
his abductor still remains at large). 
6 MINN. STAT. § 243.166.1(1) (1991). The statute mandated registration 
following a conviction for kidnapping, criminal sexual conduct, solicitation of 
children to engage in sexual conduct, use of minors in sexual performance, or 
solicitation of children to practice prostitution. Id. 
7 See MINN. STAT. § 243.166 (1993) (expanding registration to include 
individuals convicted of sexual offenses with adult victims). See also Logan, 
supra note 5, at 1294 (noting that State Senator Joe Bertram initiated reform 
efforts to expand the category of offenses which would prompt registration). 
8 MINN. STAT. § 243.166 (1993). Specifically, the 1993 Amendments 
require a person to register as a predatory offender if: 
1) the person was charged with a felony violation of or attempt to 
violate any of the following, and convicted of that offense or of another 
offense arising out of the same set of circumstances: i) murder under 
section 609.185, clause (2); or ii) kidnapping under section 609.25, 
involving a minor victim; or iii) criminal sexual conduct under section 
609.342, subdivision 1, paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), or (f); 609.343 
subdivision 1, paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), or (f); 609.344 
subdivision 1, paragraph (c) or (d); or 609.345; subdivision 1 paragraph 
(c), or (d); or 2) the person was convicted of a predatory crime as 
defined in section 609.1352, and the offender was sentenced as a 
patterned sex offender or the court found on its own motion or that of 
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The Eighth Circuit, in Gunderson v. Hvass, interpreted the 
1993 amendments, holding that a defendant cleared of predatory 
offense charges was nonetheless required to register as a predatory 
offender.9 Although extensive forensic evidence failed to 
substantiate any allegations of sexual assault, the Eighth Circuit 
upheld Gunderson’s registration requirement because it determined 
that his ultimate conviction for third-degree assault arose out of the 
same set of circumstances as the initially charged predatory 
offense.10 
This note analyzes the constitutional problems inherent in 
mandating registration as a predatory offender when an individual 
has never been convicted of a sexual offense. Part I analyzes the 
court’s holding and rationale in Gunderson. Part II provides 
background on state registration laws with a focus on the 
continuing expansion of Minnesota’s Predatory Offender Statute. 
Part III addresses the substantive and procedural due process 
challenges to Minnesota’s registration statute. Part IV addresses 
other consequences of Minnesota’s registration statute, including 
the unfettered discretion conferred on the prosecution and the 
eventual decline of plea bargaining.11 Given the due process 
concerns raised by Minnesota’s statute, Part V proposes that if a 
defendant has never been convicted of a sexual offense, 
registration should be discretionary following a hearing in which 
the defendant is provided an opportunity to present evidence and 
call witnesses to challenge his inclusion on a sex offender registry. 
                                                          
the prosecutor that the crime was part of a predatory pattern of behavior 
that had criminal sexual conduct as its goal. 
Id. 
9 Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639, 642 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 
2004 U.S. LEXIS 364 (2004) (upholding Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711 
(Minn. 1999), which held that a defendant cleared of predatory offense charges 
is required to register as a predatory offender under Minnesota Statute §243.166 
because he was convicted of a non-predatory offense which arose out of the 
same set of circumstances as the charged predatory offense). 
10 Id. at 641-42. 
11 State v. Newell, 2002 Minn. App. Lexis 1153 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) 
(noting “the enormity of the potential unchecked power this statute, as written, 
places in the hands of the prosecution who has sole control over which offense 
to charge”). 
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This reform safeguards a defendant’s constitutional right to contest 
the imposition of this stigmatizing label in an adversarial 
proceeding while still effectuating the primary purpose of the 
statute—to protect society from predatory offenders. 
I.  GUNDERSON V. HVASS 
On August 6, 2003, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s decision in Gunderson v. Hvass, holding that a defendant 
who was cleared of all sexual assault charges nonetheless was 
required to register as a predatory offender.12 While noting that 
Minnesota’s Predatory Offender Statute could produce “unfair 
results,” the Eighth Circuit discerned no constitutional 
impediments in affirming the district court’s holding that an 
individual dismissed of sexual assault charges must register as a 
sexual offender.13 Minnesota’s statute requires individuals 
convicted of only a non-predatory offense to register as a predatory 
offender if the non-predatory offense “arises out of the same set of 
circumstances” as the originally charged predatory offense.14 
Therefore, although only convicted of assault in the third degree, 
Brian Gunderson was required to register as a sexual offender 
because the court determined, based solely on the allegations 
contained in the criminal complaint, that his assault conviction 
arose out of the same circumstances as an initial charge for first-
degree criminal sexual conduct.15 
                                                          
12 Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 641; MINN. STAT. § 243.166 (2003). 
13 Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 645 (noting that the statute and relevant 
precedent mandate that a defendant charged with both a predatory and a non-
predatory offense who proceeds to trial and is acquitted of the predatory offense 
but convicted of the non-predatory offense must still register as a predatory 
offender). 
14 MINN. STAT. § 243.166.1(a)(1) (2003). 
15 Gunderson, 339 F.3d. at 642. See Minnesota v. Kemmer, 2001 Minn. 
App. LEXIS 379 (Minn. App. 2001) (holding that when it is clear that the 
charged offense and the offense to which the accused pled guilty “involved the 
same victim and occurred on the same date at the same place,” then the two 
offenses are deemed to have arisen from the same set of circumstances). Here, 
because Gunderson’s charged offense and the offense to which he pled guilty 
involved the same victim and occurred at the same place and on the same date, 
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The original complaint charging Gunderson with a sexual 
offense arose out of an incident involving a woman he met at a 
bar.16 The complainant alleged that Gunderson sexually assaulted 
her after driving her home.17 Gunderson consistently denied any 
sexual contact with the victim although he admitted that a physical 
altercation occurred.18 Forensic tests on biological samples from 
the victim corroborated Gunderson’s account.19 Based on this 
forensic evidence, the original complaint, which charged 
Gunderson with a sexual offense, was dismissed in its entirety.20 A 
new complaint was filed against Gunderson, charging him with 
third-degree assault from the same incident.21 Gunderson pled 
guilty to the new complaint.22 During his plea allocution, however, 
Gunderson was not informed of his duty to register as a predatory 
offender.23 Indeed, he was not made aware of his duty to register as 
a predatory offender until he was later incarcerated for a violation 
of probation less than a year after his conviction.24 
Gunderson subsequently filed suit in the Minnesota district 
court, alleging that the statute requiring him to register as a sexual 
offender was an unconstitutional violation of his substantive and 
procedural due process rights.25 The district court, however, 
                                                          
the court determined that the two offenses arose out of the same set of 
circumstances. Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 641-42. 
16 Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 641. The incident is alleged to have occurred 
March 31, 1998. Id. 
17 Id. The complainant claimed that Gunderson took off her pants while 
punching her and holding her arms and then had non-consensual sexual 
intercourse with her and ejaculated inside her vagina. Id. at 641. 
18 Id. (noting that additional laboratory reports conducted by the Minnesota 
Bureau of Criminal Apprehension did not detect the presence of semen from 
physical examinations of the victim). 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639, 641 (8th Cir. 2003). 
22 Id. Gunderson was placed on probation for three years and received a 
stayed sentence of fifteen months imprisonment. Id. at 641-42. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 642. 
25 Id. Gunderson argued that registration as a predatory offender implicates 
a fundamental right, specifically, the presumption of innocence, and therefore 
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concluded that Gunderson’s registration under Minnesota’s 
Predatory Offender Registration Statute did not violate 
Gunderson’s constitutional rights.26 The district court determined 
that the registration requirements were not violative of 
Gunderson’s procedural due process rights because of the minimal 
burdens imposed on registrants and because the fundamental right 
to a presumption of innocence is only implicated in criminal 
statutes and not regulatory laws like the registration statute.27 The 
court then determined that the registration requirement was 
properly applied to a defendant charged with both predatory and 
non-predatory offenses who pleads guilty only to a non-predatory 
offense.28 
In affirming the district court’s finding that Gunderson was 
required to register as a predatory offender, the Eighth Circuit 
relied on the Minnesota Supreme Court decision in Boutin v. La 
Fleur.29 In Boutin, the court interpreted the “arising out of the 
same set of circumstances” phrase of the Minnesota statute to 
require the registration of a defendant convicted of a non-sexual 
offense if the non-sexual offense arose out of the same set of 
circumstances as a charged predatory offense.30 Defendant 
                                                          
his substantive due process rights were violated. Id. Additionally, Gunderson 
asserted that he had a protectible liberty interest in not registering. Gunderson v. 
Hvass, No. Civ. 01-646, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18674 (D. Minn. 2002). 
26 Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 641. 
27 Gunderson v. Hvass, No. Civ. 01-646, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18674, at 
*4-5 (D. Minn. 2002). 
28 Id. at *6. 
29 591 N.W.2d 711 (Minn. 1999). This case was the first to examine the 
1993 Amendments to Minnesota’s Predatory Offender Registration Statute. Id. 
30 Id. at 716. Predatory offenses include murder while committing or 
attempting to commit criminal sexual conduct in the first-degree or second-
degree with force or violence; kidnapping; criminal sexual conduct in the first, 
second, third, fourth and fifth (felony only) degree; felony indecent exposure; 
false imprisonment of a minor; soliciting a minor to engage in prostitution or 
sexual conduct; using a minor in a sexual performance; and possessing 
pornographic work involving minors. MINN. STAT. § 243.166.1(a)(1)-(2) (2003). 
See also Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, 2000 Predatory Offender 
Registration Tracking Program: Offenses Requiring Registration, available at 
http://www.dps.state.mn.us/bca/Invest/Documents/Offenses%20 
Requiring%0Registration.pdf. 
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Timothy Boutin was charged with two counts of criminal sexual 
conduct in the third degree, one count of assault in the third degree, 
and one count of misdemeanor assault in the third degree.31 
Boutin’s charges stemmed from allegations made by Denise 
Rathman, Boutin’s girlfriend, that he physically abused her and 
forced her to have sexual intercourse with him.32 Boutin admitted 
that he had non-consensual sexual intercourse with Rathman, 
stating that “she didn’t want to and I still did it I guess.”33 Because 
Rathman later recanted her allegations of sexual assault, Boutin 
pled guilty to third-degree assault.34 Although the criminal sexual 
conduct charges were dismissed against Boutin, Boutin was 
nevertheless required to register as a predatory offender.35 The 
Supreme Court affirmed the registration requirement because 
Boutin was initially charged with an enumerated predatory offense 
which arose out of the same set of circumstances as the charged 
predatory offense.36 
Gunderson sought to factually distinguish Boutin’s case from 
his own, noting that his conviction arose from a complaint which 
charged only a non-sexual offense while Boutin’s conviction arose 
from a complaint which charged both a predatory and a non-
predatory offense.37 The court summarily dismissed Gunderson’s 
argument, holding that the statute does not demand that a non-
predatory offense be charged in the same complaint as a predatory 
offense; it demands only that the conviction arise from the same 
set of circumstances as an enumerated predatory offense.38 Here, 
since both offenses occurred on the same date, at the same place, 
and involved the same victim, the court found that Gunderson’s 
conviction for third-degree assault arose out of the same set of 
circumstances as his initial charge for first-degree criminal sexual 
                                                          
31 Boutin, 591 N.W.2d at 713. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 714. 
36 Id. at 716. 
37 Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 641. See supra text accompanying notes 15-21. 
38 Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 642-43. 
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conduct.39 
The court next addressed Gunderson’s constitutional 
challenges to the statute.40 First, the court determined that the 
statute was not violative of Gunderson’s substantive due process 
rights because no fundamental right was implicated.41 In a 
substantive due process analysis, if a fundamental right is 
implicated, the state must advance a legitimate and compelling 
governmental interest for interfering with that right.42 If no 
fundamental right is implicated, then the standard of review is 
“less exacting” and the statute will be upheld so long as it was 
determined to be rationally related to a legitimate governmental 
purpose.43 While noting the presumption of innocence to be a 
fundamental right, the court concluded that such a right is only 
implicated in either a criminal or punitive law, not a regulatory 
law.44 No fundamental right was implicated because the 
registration statute was found to be non-punitive.45 Therefore, to 
withstand any constitutional challenge, the statute only needed to 
be rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective.46 Here, 
                                                          
39 Id. at 643. But see Murphy v. Wood, 545 N.W.2d 52, 53-54 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1996) (holding that a factual record was necessary to determine whether 
defendant’s sexual assault charge arose out of the same set of circumstances as 
his conviction for aggravated robbery and assault). 
40 See Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 643. 
41 Id. at 643-44. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
42 Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 643-44. 
43 Id. at 643. “In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory 
classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental 
constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is 
any reasonably conceivable basis for the classification.” F.C.C. v. Beach 
Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). 
44 Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 643. See State v. Edwards, 130 N.W.2d 623, 626 
(Minn. 1964) (noting that while the Constitution has not expressly provided the 
presumption of innocence to be a fundamental right, courts have treated it as 
such). 
45 Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 643 (citing Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711, 
717 (Minn. 1999) (holding that the registration statute was non-punitive given 
that registration as a predatory offender is not a permanent requirement and that 
it does not restrict a registrant’s ability to change residences or to move out of 
state)). 
46 Id. 
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the court found the registration statute was rationally related to the 
government’s legitimate interest in requiring all predatory 
offenders to register, “including those who take advantage of 
favorable plea agreements.”47 
Second, the court dismissed Gunderson’s claim that 
Minnesota’s Predatory Offender Registration Statute violated his 
procedural due process rights.48 While the court conceded that 
Gunderson’s reputation would undoubtedly be injured by 
mandating his registration as a sexual offender, the court noted that 
reputation, alone, is insufficient “to invoke the procedural 
protections of the due process clause.”49 Reputational harm must 
be coupled with another tangible element to rise to the level of a 
protectible property interest.50 The court reasoned that the 
requirements of Minnesota’s registration statute posed only a 
minimal burden on the registrant.51 The court noted that the initial 
registration process would require only that Gunderson provide his 
fingerprints, a photograph, and information about his whereabouts 
                                                          
47 Id. at 643 (quoting U.S. Magistrate Judge Raymond L. Erickson’s report 
to the district court, Gunderson v. Hvass, No. 01-646, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
21783, at *25 (D. Minn. 2002)). In his report, the Magistrate Judge commented: 
Given the realities of the plea bargaining system, by extending the 
registration requirements to persons who are charged with a predatory 
offense, but plead guilty to a non-predatory charge that arises from the 
same circumstances, the Minnesota Legislature was attempting to 
insure the inclusion in the registration rolls, of all predatory offenders, 
including those who take advantage of favorable plea agreements. The 
fact that such a registration policy may, in fact, require the inclusion of 
persons who are not predators, is not a fatal Constitutional defect. 
Gunderson v. Hvass, No. 01-646, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21783, at *25 (D. 
Minn. June 10, 2002) [hereinafter Magistrate’s Report]. 
48 Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 644. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
49 Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 644. 
50 Id. As identified in the Magistrate’s Report, if reputational harm is 
coupled with a change in legal status, if State or Federal employment is denied, 
or if entitlements under State or Federal law are diminished as a result of the 
registration requirement, then a registrant has identified a protectible property 
interest. Magistrate’s Report, supra note 47, at *42. See discussion infra Part 
III.A.2. 
51 Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 644. 
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to local law enforcement;52 Gunderson’s only obligation thereafter 
would be to update his address information annually.53 Therefore, 
because Gunderson failed to identify a protectible property 
interest, the court rejected his procedural due process claim.54 
Finding no viable due process challenges to the statute, the court 
affirmed Gunderson’s obligation to register as a predatory 
offender.55 
II.  OVERVIEW OF STATE SEXUAL OFFENDER REGISTRATION 
STATUTES 
The majority of states enacted sexual offender registration laws 
after Congress passed the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against 
                                                          
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 645. Justice Beam was the only judge to issue a separate opinion 
from the majority. In his concurrence, he noted that although the police 
investigation clearly established a lack of sexual contact between Gunderson and 
the complainant, and that the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Boutin 
would seem to “turn reason and fairness on its head,” he nonetheless agreed with 
the court that Gunderson asserted no Fourteenth Amendment due process 
violation. Id. 
55 Id. Gunderson’s duty to register as a predatory offender requires him to 
register all primary addresses, all secondary addresses, the addresses of all 
Minnesota property owned, leased or rented by him, the addresses of all 
locations where he is employed, the addresses of all residences where he resides 
when attending school, and the make, model, license plate number, and color of 
all vehicles owned or regularly driven by him. MINN. STAT. § 243.166.4a(b)(1)-
(6) (2003). He must provide law enforcement with a fingerprint card, a 
photograph, and a written consent form allowing a treatment facility to release 
information to law enforcement. MINN. STAT. § 243.166.4(a). He must also 
notify law enforcement five days before each residence change. MINN. STAT. § 
243.166.3(b) Additionally, he must register as a predatory offender in every 
other state where he works or attends school. MINN. STAT. § 243.166.3(d). 
Gunderson must update his information annually. MINN. STAT. § 
243.166.4(e)(3). Violation of any of these provisions constitutes a felony, which 
carries a maximum sentence of five years in prison. MINN. STAT. § 
243.166.5(a)-(b). While Minnesota does not automatically provide for the public 
dissemination of Gunderson’s registration, if he is not in compliance with the 
registration provisions for over thirty days, his personal information and a 
photograph may be released to the public. MINN. STAT. § 243.166.7a. 
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Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act.56 This 
Act, part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act 
of 1994, encourages states to create registries of offenders 
convicted of crimes against children or sexually violent offenses.57 
The Act provides that if a state fails to create a registry within 
three years of its enactment, the state loses ten percent of its 
federal crime control grant funds.58 Additionally, states that create 
registries of sexually violent offenders are awarded grants by the 
Director of the Bureau of Justice Assistance to offset the costs of 
complying with the registration program.59 
The Jacob Wetterling Act provides states with a “minimum 
baseline” for their registration programs.60 States are free to 
impose, and indeed have imposed, more rigorous provisions when 
                                                          
56 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2003). See Lieb, supra note 2 (noting that several 
states enacted sex offender registration laws prior to Congress’ passage of the 
Jacob Wetterling Act). California enacted the nation’s first registration law in 
1944. Id. Following California, Arizona enacted its registration law in 1951, 
although this law was repealed and later replaced. Id. Between 1957-1967, 
Florida, Nevada, Ohio; and Alabama followed suit, enacting their own 
registration statutes. Id. 
57 See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 
No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994); see also 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(1)(A)-(B) 
(2003) (mandating that the Attorney General establish guidelines for state 
programs that require registration of individuals convicted of criminal offenses 
against a minor or those convicted of a sexually violent offense). See Caroline 
Louise Lewis, The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually 
Violent Offender Registration Act: An Unconstitutional Deprivation of the Right 
to Privacy and Substantive Due Process, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 89, 94 
(1996). The provision of the Act that required sex offenders to register upon 
release from confinement received overwhelming support from both Democrats 
and Republicans. Id. 
58 42 U.S.C. § 14071(g)(1)-(2) (2003). The statute provides that the 
Attorney General may extend the deadline for compliance by two years for any 
“state that is making a good faith effort to implement” the registry. Id. 
59 42 U.S.C. § 14071(i)(1)(A) (2003). Such funds are distributed directly to 
the state and are to be used for training, salaries, equipment, materials, and other 
costs. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(i)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) (2003). 
60 Wayne A. Logan, A Study in “Actuarial Justice”: Sex Offender 
Classification Practice and Procedure, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 593, 599 (2000) 
(noting that the Jacob Wetterling Act “constitute[s] a floor for state programs, 
not a ceiling”). 
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enacting their own sex offender registries.61 The Act provides that 
“a determination of whether a person is a sexually violent 
predator . . . shall be made by a court after considering the 
recommendation of a board composed of experts in the behavior 
and treatment of sex offenders, victims’ rights advocates and 
representatives of law enforcement agencies.”62 States, however, 
may waive this requirement if they have established equally or 
more rigorous alternate procedures or legal standards for 
designating an individual as a sexually violent predator.63 At 
minimum, a state registration program must require each registrant 
to 1) provide local law enforcement officials with the registrant’s 
name, address, a photograph, and fingerprints;64 2) report any 
change in address and notify proper authorities of any intention to 
move to another state; and 3) register in the state where he is 
employed or attending school.65 Finally, each registrant must read 
and sign a document informing him of his duty to register as either 
a sexually violent offender or an offender convicted of crimes 
against children.66 Registration is required for ten years.67 Lifetime 
registration, however, is mandated for any individual either 
classified as a sexually violent predator or convicted of an 
aggravated offense.68 
                                                          
61 Id. (noting that states may “broaden the list of eligible offense categories, 
lengthen the mandated registration period, and impose other measures more 
stringent than required by the Wetterling Act”). While the Jacob Wetterling Act 
specifies that information concerning sex offenders must be released to the 
public, states retain discretion in determining the method and extent of 
registration information that is released to the public. Id. 
62 See 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(2)(A) (2003). 
63 See 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(2)(B) (2003); see also 42 U.S.C. § 
14071(a)(3)(C) (defining the term “sexually violent predator” as a person 
convicted of a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental 
abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in 
predatory sexually violent offenses). 
64 See 42 U.S.C. § 14071(b)(1)(A)(ii),(iv), (B) (2003); Logan, supra note 
60, at 599. 
65 42 U.S.C. § 14071(b)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii) (2003). 
66 Id. § 14071(b)(1)(A)(v). 
67 Id. § 14071(b)(6)(A). 
68 Id. § 14071(b)(6)(ii)—(iii). “The term ‘sexually violent predator’ means 
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A.  States’ Approaches to Registration under the Jacob 
Wetterling Act 
The federal guidelines imposed by the Jacob Wetterling Act 
produced varying state approaches to registration.69 States differ as 
to the extent to which the public can access information contained 
in the registry.70 For example, Florida, New York, and California 
have created hotlines where callers can obtain information 
regarding registered sex offenders.71 In over thirty states, 
information concerning registrants is disseminated via the 
internet,72 and in Washington, D.C., such information can be 
                                                          
a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense and who suffers 
from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely 
to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses.” See supra note 63. Id. § 
14071(a)(3)(c). An individual commits aggravated sexual abuse when he 
knowingly uses force or threat of force to cause another to engage in a sexual 
act. 18 U.S.C. § 2241 (2004). 
69 Doe v. Williams, 167 F. Supp. 2d 45, 47 (D.D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that 
because the Jacob Wetterling Act established only minimum standards, states 
have differed in their statutory approaches to registration and community 
notification). 
70 Carol L. Kunz, Toward Dispassionate, Effective Control of Sexual 
Offenders, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 453, 458 (1997) (noting that the flexibility of the 
Jacob Wetterling Act has led to diversity among state registration and 
notification statutes and that state notification statutes vary “in terms of . . . the 
scope of . . . notification, and the manner in which this process is carried out”). 
71 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE 290.4 (Deering 2004) (permitting “the 
department to operate a ‘900’ telephone number [so] that members of the public 
may call and inquire whether a named individual” is contained in the registry); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.21(6)(k)(2) (West 2003) (authorizing the department “to 
disseminate this public information by any means deemed appropriate, including 
operating a toll-free telephone number for this purpose”); N.Y. CORRECT LAW § 
168-p (Consol. 2003) (establishing a “900” telephone number so the public may 
call and inquire whether a named individual is required to register). 
72 Kimberly B. Wilkins, Sex Offender Registration and Community 
Notification Laws: Will These Laws Survive?, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 1245 (2003) 
(noting that thirty-two states make their registries available on the internet). See, 
e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.087(g) (2003) (requiring the Department of Public 
Safety to post on the internet a list of offenders who have failed to register, 
whose addresses cannot be verified or who otherwise cannot be located); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. § 26 (2003) (establishing Delaware’s Sex Offender Registry 
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obtained through local law enforcement agencies.73 In certain 
states, including Minnesota, access is more restricted.74 
State laws also vary as to the length of registration. For 
example, Florida requires lifetime registration for all “sexual 
predators” while Maine and Minnesota provide for a ten-year 
registration period.75 The penalties for non-compliance also vary 
between states.76 
Additionally, state registration statutes vary as to whether 
                                                          
Internet Web Site, which allows the general public to receive updates by 
geographical region whenever a sex offender is added to, deleted from, or has 
any change in status on the registry). 
73 COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-22-112(2) (2003) (authorizing local law 
enforcement agencies to release to any person residing within the agency’s 
jurisdiction information regarding any person registered with the local law 
enforcement agency); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4011(a)-(B) (2003) (allowing the 
Metropolitan Police Department to make registration lists and information about 
registrants available for public inspection at police stations); S.C. CODE ANN. § 
23-3-490(a) (Law. Co-op. 2002) (making information collected for the registry 
open to public inspection, upon request to the county sheriff). 
74 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 846E-3(d) (Michie 2003). Hawaii does not 
provide for automatic release of registration information. Id. The state must first 
petition for release of information in a civil proceeding. Id. At this hearing, the 
offender has the opportunity to present evidence to show that he is not a threat to 
the community and that the public release of his information is not necessary to 
the safety of the community. Id. Like Hawaii, Minnesota does not provide for 
automatic dissemination of information contained in the registry. See MINN. 
STAT. § 243.166.7 (2003) (providing that registration information is considered 
“private data” and may only be used for law enforcement purposes). 
75 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3821 (2003) (requiring lifetime registration 
after a conviction for sexual conduct with a minor); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
775.21(6)(l) (West 2003) (requiring lifetime registration for sexual predators); 
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 846E-2 (Michie 2003) (requiring compliance with 
registration requirements for the lifetime of the offender); 34-A ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 11225 (2003) (requiring sex offenders to register for a period of ten 
years from the initial date of registration). 
76 See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-t (Consol. 2003) (treating a first offense 
as class A misdemeanor); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.11 (2003) (treating any 
violation for non-compliance as a Class F felony); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-470 
(b)(1) (Law Co-op. 2002) (treating a first offense as a misdemeanor with a 
mandatory sentence of ninety days incarceration). 
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registration is compulsory or discretionary.77 In Massachusetts, a 
state which employs discretionary classification, anyone convicted 
of a sex crime is entitled to a hearing before a Sex Offender 
Registry Board, where the offender can argue against inclusion on 
the registration list.78 In contrast, nineteen states including 
Minnesota employ compulsory classification, whereby a court 
must classify a defendant as a sexual predator if the defendant 
satisfies the specified criteria in the statute.79 In states requiring 
compulsory classification, the court does not have the ability to 
modify the person’s duty to register.80 Alaska, a state that employs 
the compulsory approach, has rationalized this approach, finding 
“the fact of an offender’s conviction for a sex offense . . . sufficient 
reason to include that offender in the registry because of the 
potential for re-offense.”81 
States also differ with respect to the range of offenses that will 
trigger registration.82 The Jacob Wetterling Act specifies that states 
                                                          
77 See Logan, supra note 60, at 603. 
78 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6 § 178K (2004); see Turner, John C., Megan’s 
Law: Safety Net or Noose?, CONN. L. TRIB., Dec. 27, 1999. In determining 
whether to relieve the registrant of his duty to register, the Sex Offender 
Registry Board shall consider whether the offender’s criminal history indicates a 
risk of re-offense or a danger to the public as well as whether any physical harm 
was caused by the offense and whether the offense involved consensual conduct 
between adults. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6 § 178K (2)(d) (2004). 
79 Logan, supra note 60, at 603 (noting that Alabama, Alaska, California, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and Virginia all employ compulsory classification of 
sex offenders). 
80 See MINN. STAT. § 243.166.2 (2003) (stating that “the Court may not 
modify the person’s duty to register in the pronounced sentence or deposition 
order”). 
81 Logan, supra note 60, at 605. Similarly, Alabama provides that “certain 
juveniles and all adults convicted of a ‘criminal sex offense,’ are subject to 
compulsory registration and community notification by means of a ‘notification 
flyer,’ which is distributed by hand or regular mail by police.” Id. See ALA. 
CODE 15-20-21(3) (2003). 
82 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-200 (2003) (mandating registration for 
the following offenses: sexual perversion involving a member of the same or 
opposite sex, sexual abuse involving any member of the same or opposite sex, 
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may impose registration for sexually violent offenses that include 
or exceed aggravated sexual abuse or any offense that involves 
“engaging in physical contact with another with the intent to 
commit aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse.”83 Consequently, 
states have composed varying lists of enumerated offenses that 
require registration.84 A minority of states demand registration if 
the defendant’s offense was “sexually motivated” or committed for 
a sexual purpose.85 
B. Minnesota’s Predatory Offender Registration Act 
In 1991, Minnesota became the fifteenth state to enact a sex 
offender registration statute.86 Although several senators 
“expressed concern that registration was contrary to the idea that 
released offenders had paid their debt to society” and “tends to 
                                                          
rape, sodomy, sexual misconduct, indecent exposure, promoting prostitution in 
the first or second degree, obscenity, incest, or an attempt to commit any of 
these crimes); IOWA CODE § 692A.2 (2003) (mandating registration for any 
individual who has been convicted of a criminal offense against a minor, an 
aggravated offense, sexual exploitation or a sexually violent offense); 42 PA. 
CONS. STAT. § 9795.1(a)(1)-(2) (2003) (mandating ten year registration for the 
following offenses: kidnapping a minor, indecent assault, incest where the 
victim is between the ages of twelve and eighteen, promoting prostitution of a 
minor, obscenity where the victim is a minor, sexual abuse of children, unlawful 
contact with a minor, and sexual exploitation of children or any attempt to 
commit these offenses). Lifetime registration is required for rape, involuntary 
deviate sexual intercourse, sexual assault, aggravated indecent assault, incest 
where the victim is under twelve years-old, and sexually violent predators. 42 
PA. CONS. STAT. § 9795.1(b)(2)-(3) (2003). 
83 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(3)(B) (2003). 
84 See Logan, supra note 60, at 599 (noting that states may expand the 
categories of offenses that mandate registration). 
85 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 290(a)(2)(E) (Deering 2004) (mandating 
registration if the crime is committed for “purposes of sexual gratification”); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4902(c)(14) (2002) (requiring registration for “any act 
which at the time of sentencing for the offense has been determined beyond a 
reasonable doubt to have been sexually motivated”); W. VA. CODE § 15-12-2(c) 
(2003) (demanding registration if the offense was “sexually motivated”). 
86 Logan, supra note 5, at 1293 (noting that Minnesota was a “forerunner 
with respect to sex offender registration and community notification). See MINN. 
STAT. § 243.166 (2003). 
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deprive people of their freedom of movement and freedom of 
privacy,” the Predatory Offender Registration Act passed 
Minnesota’s House and the Senate by a commanding majority.87 
The original version of the Act mandated registration if an offender 
had been convicted of any of the following child-related offenses: 
kidnapping a minor; criminal sexual conduct toward a minor; 
solicitation of children to engage in sexual conduct; use of minors 
in a sexual performance; or solicitation of children to practice 
prostitution.88 Any violation for non-compliance was considered a 
misdemeanor.89 
The 1993 amendments to Minnesota’s Predatory Offender 
Registration Statute considerably expanded the range of offenses 
that require registration.90 Significantly, the amended law 
mandates registration if an individual is “charged with a felony 
violation” or an “attempt to violate” an enumerated offense, and is 
“convicted of that offense or of another offense arising out of the 
same set of circumstances.”91 Additionally, registration was 
extended to offenses involving adult victims.92 Amendments 
passed in 1996 broadened the scope of registration by requiring 
registration of persons adjudicated as sexually dangerous or those 
having sexual psychopathic personalities, regardless of whether the 
person was convicted of any offense.93 The 1999 amendments 
further expanded registration to include those persons found not 
guilty by reason of insanity.94 
                                                          
87 Logan, supra note 5 at 1292-93. 
88 MINN. STAT. § 243.166.1(1) (1991). 
89 MINN. STAT. § 243.166.5. 
90 Logan, supra note 5, at 1294 (noting that the amendments greatly 
expanded “the array of criminal behaviors” that would require registration). 
91 Id. at 1294-95 (emphasis added); see MINN. STAT. § 243.166.1(1) (1993). 
92 Logan, supra note 5, at 1295; see MINN. STAT. § 243.166.1(1) (1993). 
93 MINN. STAT. § 243.166.4(c) (1996). To be adjudicated as either “sexually 
dangerous” or having a “sexual psychopathic personality,” facts must be 
submitted to the county attorney who will prepare a petition if good cause is 
shown. MINN. STAT. § 253B.185.1 (2003). A court will then hear the petition 
alleging that the patient who is subject to commitment at a treatment facility is a 
sexually dangerous person or is a person with a sexual psychopathic personality. 
Id. See Logan, supra note 5, at 1306. 
94 MINN. STAT. § 243.166.4(d)(2) (1999); see Logan, supra note 5, at 1308 
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Katie’s Law, a Minnesota statute passed in response to the 
brutal kidnapping and murder of nineteen year old Katie Poirier, 
resulted in a further expansion of the state’s registration laws.95 
First, Katie’s Law stiffened the penalties for non-compliance with 
registration requirements.96 Registration violations, including 
failure to register address changes or return annual verification 
letters, could extend the registration period by an additional five 
years.97 The first violation of the statute subjects the offender to a 
mandatory minimum sentence of one year in prison.98 A second 
violation carries a minimum of two years incarceration.99 
Additionally, Katie’s Law provided that if a person subject to the 
registration requirement is out of compliance for thirty days, the 
Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension may disseminate 
information about the offender, including a photograph, to the 
public.100 The information released must be limited to that 
necessary for the public to assist law enforcement in locating the 
sex offender.101 
Commentators have praised Minnesota’s Predatory Offender 
                                                          
(noting that the 1999 amendments were a legislative response to the acquittal, 
for reasons of insanity, of a defendant who was charged with raping a thirteen 
year-old girl). 
95 MINN. STAT. § 243.166 (2000); see Logan, supra note 5, at 1311-13 
(noting that the defendant charged with Katie’s murder “had an extensive 
history of sex offense convictions” but was not subject to registration and 
community notification because these laws did not apply retroactively). 
96 MINN. STAT. § 243.166.5(a)-(b)(2000); see Logan, supra note 5, at 1313-
14. 
97 MINN. STAT. § 243.166.6(b) (2000). 
98 MINN. STAT. § 243.166.5(b). 
99 MINN. STAT. § 243.166.5(c). 
100 MINN. STAT. § 243.166.7a. The Bureau of Criminal Apprehension may 
make information available regarding offenders who fail to return their annual 
verification letters or provide their primary or secondary residence to the public 
through electronic, computerized, or other accessible means. Id. This publication 
possibility applies to all offenders over the age of sixteen who have been out of 
compliance for at least thirty days. Id. 
101 Id. Minnesota’s registry presently contains over 11,000 registrants. 
Klaas Kids Foundation, Megan’s Law by State: Minnesota, available at 
http://www.klaaskids.org/st-minn.htm. Seventy percent are believed to be in 
compliance. Id. 
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Registration Act as being one of the “least onerous” in the 
nation.102 Indeed, the ten year period of registration is comparably 
shorter than most other states.103 In addition, unlike the registration 
statutes of most states, Minnesota does not provide for automatic 
public access to the information contained in the registry.104 
Furthermore, registrants in Minnesota are only required to verify 
their registration materials annually through a certified mailing, in 
contrast to other jurisdictions that require verification of 
registration materials in person and with greater frequency.105 
In spite of the arguable moderateness of the provisions of 
Minnesota’s registration statute, the statute as implemented reflects 
an enduring rigidity.106 First, an offender is required to register 
even if the original sexual offense charges are dismissed or 
withdrawn and the offender’s remaining charge is a non-
registerable offense.107 Furthermore, Minnesota’s Bureau of 
                                                          
102 Logan, supra note 5, at 1322-23 (noting that “true to its reputation for 
moderation in criminal justice issues more generally, Minnesota’s registration 
and community notification laws rank among the nation’s least onerous in a 
variety of respects”). 
103 See Logan, supra note 5, at 1323. See also, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-
3821 (2003) (requiring lifetime registration after a conviction for sexual conduct 
with a minor); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.21(6)(l) (West 2003) (requiring lifetime 
registration for sexual predators); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 846E-2(a) (Michie 
2003) (mandating lifetime registration). 
104 See Logan, supra note 5, at 1324 n. 286 (noting that Washington, D.C. 
and New Mexico disseminate registrants’ employment addresses and that 
Arizona provides a map that indicates the registrant’s home address and the 
closest day care centers and schools); MINN. STAT. § 243.166.7 (2003) 
(providing that registration data is considered “private data” and “may be used 
only for law enforcement purposes”). 
105 See Logan, supra note 5, at 1323 n. 279 (noting that Hawaii, Kansas, 
and Michigan all require quarterly verification); MINN. STAT. § 243.166.4(e)(3) 
(2003) (providing the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension shall send registration 
information to registrants on an annual basis). 
106 See Logan, supra note 5, at 1320 (noting that Minnesota’s law “numbers 
among the nation’s most moderate in function and scope”). 
107 Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, 2000 Predatory Offender 
Registration and Tracking Program, Minnesota Statutes Sections 243.166 and 
243.167: Frequently Asked Questions, available at http://www.dps.state.mn.us 
/bca/Invest/Documents/Frequently%20Asked%20Questions.pdf; see generally 
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Criminal Apprehension (“BCA”) requires an offender to register as 
a sex offender even if the registerable offense is expunged from his 
criminal record.108 An offender can only be exempt from the duty 
to register by obtaining a separate order expunging his registration 
requirements.109 Finally, registration under Minnesota’s statute is 
compulsory, thereby prohibiting the court from modifying a 
person’s duty to register.110 The BCA provides that if a judge 
exercises discretion and finds that an individual is not required to 
register for a registerable offense, law enforcement and corrections 
agents have the authority to circumvent the judge’s ruling.111 The 
BCA directs those agencies to assist the offender with the 
registration process in spite of a judge’s contrary ruling.112 
Minnesota’s Predatory Offender Registration Statute requires 
the registrant to provide the citation for his original charges, his 
relationship to the victim, the victim’s age, race, and sex, as well as 
a brief description of his crime and past conviction record.113 The 
registrant must read and initial all provisions contained in the 
“Duty to Register” form, including an acknowledgement that it is 
his “duty to register as a predatory offender” in accordance with 
Minnesota law.114 
                                                          
Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639 (affirming Gunderson’s duty to register as a 
predatory offender even though his predatory offense charge was dismissed in 
its entirety). 
108 Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, 2000 Predatory Offender 
Registration and Tracking Program, Minnesota Statutes Sections 243.166 and 
243.167: Frequently Asked Questions, available at http://www.dps.state.mn.us 
/bca/Invest/Documents/Frequently%20Asked%20Questions.pdf. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, 2000 Predatory Offender 
Registration and Tracking Program, Minnesota Statutes Sections 243.166 and 
243.167: Blank Forms, available at http://www.dps.state.mn.us/bca/Invest/ 
Documents/BlankForms.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2004). 
114 Id. 
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III.  VIABLE DUE PROCESS CHALLENGES TO MINNESOTA’S 
PREDATORY OFFENDER REGISTRATION STATUTE 
While registration statutes have come under considerable 
attack, they have thus far uniformly survived constitutional 
challenges.115 Courts have sustained registration statutes against 
equal protection,116 due process,117 and ex post facto challenges.118 
In spite of the general reluctance to strike down registration 
                                                          
115 Licia A. Esposito, State Statutes or Ordinances Requiring Persons 
Previously Convicted of Crime to Register with Authorities, 36 A.L.R. 5th 161 
(2004 West Group). See, e.g., Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 
1999) (upholding the Tennessee Sex Offender Registration and Monitoring Act 
against an equal protection challenge because the court determined that the Act 
had a rational basis in protecting public safety with respect to sex offenses); 
People v. Malchow, 739 N.E.2d 433 (Ind. 2000) (holding that the Illinois Sex 
Offender Registration Act, which required convicted sex offenders to register 
with local police departments, did not violate the defendant’s constitutional right 
to privacy); Byron M. v. City of Whittier, 46 F. Supp. 2d 1032 (C.D. Cal. 1998) 
(holding that the community notification requirements of the statute did not 
violate either the ex post facto or double jeopardy clauses because the statute 
was enacted to advance regulatory goals, including public safety and protection). 
116 See Artway v. Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, 81 F.3d 
1235 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that New Jersey’s statute mandating “repetitive 
and compulsive” sex offenders to register with local law enforcement did not 
violate the equal protection clause); see also Roe v. Farwell, 999 F. Supp. 174 
(D. Mass 1998) (holding that the provisions of Massachusetts “Megan’s Law” 
registration and disclosure requirements did not violate the equal protection 
clause). 
117 Patterson v. State, 985 P.2d 1007 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999) (upholding 
Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration Act against a due process challenge finding 
the statute rationally related to the legislature’s legitimate interest in promoting 
public safety). See Akella v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 67 F. Supp. 2d 716 
(E.D. Mich. 1999) (holding that Michigan’s Sex Offenders Registration Act did 
not violate substantive due process rights despite the fact that the Act applied to 
registrants who had been rehabilitated). 
118 See People v. Guillen, 717 N.E.2d 563 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (upholding 
Sex Offender Registration Act against both federal and state ex post facto 
challenges); see also Esposito, supra note 115, at *2a (stating that criminal 
registration statutes have also survived challenges based on bill of attainder, 
vagueness, right to privacy, right to travel, privilege against self-incrimination, 
cruel and unusual punishment, double jeopardy, and unreasonable search and 
seizure). 
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statutes, considerable due process concerns are raised when an 
individual who has never been convicted of a sexual offense must 
register as a predatory offender.119 Due process concerns arise 
when “fundamental procedural fairness” has been denied or when 
power is exercised “without any reasonable justification” in the 
pursuit of an otherwise legitimate governmental objective.120 
While the government undoubtedly has a valid objective in 
protecting the public, the importance of such aims does not justify 
trammeling constitutional due process protections.121 
A.  Procedural Due Process 
Procedural due process protection provides notice of a possible 
deprivation of life, liberty, or property by the government, and it 
affords a meaningful opportunity to contest the deprivation prior to 
its imposition.122 “The essence of due process is that a person in 
jeopardy of serious loss be given notice of the case against him and 
opportunity to meet it.”123 In a procedural due process analysis, 
therefore, the first inquiry is whether a protected liberty or property 
interest is implicated.124 
1. Implication of a Protectible Liberty Interest 
A protected liberty interest is implicated when an individual is 
required to register as a sex offender. For instance, the Ninth 
Circuit held in Neal v. Shimoda that a protected liberty interest was 
                                                          
119 See generally, Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818 (9th Cir. 1997). 
120 People v. Bell, No. 3610-80, 2003 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 884, at *8-9 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 2003) (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80) (1972) (asserting that 
the “central meaning” of procedural due process is clear—“parties whose rights 
are to be affected are entitled to be heard”); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 
331 (1986) (noting that the Due Process Clause was “intended to secure the 
individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government”). 
121 See Doe v. Williams, 167 F. Supp. 2d 45, 59 (D.D.C. Cir. 2001). 
122 People v. Bell, No. 3610-80, 2003 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 884, at *7-8. 
123 Id. at *8. 
124 In the Matter of Risk Level Determination of C.M, 578 N.W.2d 391, 
396 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998). 
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implicated where an inmate was dismissed of sex offense charges 
and consequently was never given an opportunity to formally 
challenge the imposition of the “sex offender” label.125 In that case, 
Neal was indicted for robbery, kidnapping, sexual assault, 
terroristic threatening, and attempted murder, but he entered into a 
plea bargain in exchange for the dismissal of the sex offense 
charges.126 Nonetheless, Neal was classified as a sex offender 
because his indictment alleged that he engaged in sexual 
misconduct during the course of his offenses.127 Neal challenged 
this application, arguing that it violated his due process rights.128 
The court found that indeed, this classification invoked due process 
protections.129 
To decide whether a protected liberty interest was implicated, 
the court noted that state statutes may grant prisoners liberty 
interests which invoke due process protections if the statutes 
impose “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation 
to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”130 Therefore, because of 
the stigmatizing consequences of being labeled a sex offender, the 
court found that this classification “is precisely the type of atypical 
and significant hardship . . . that create[s] a protected liberty 
                                                          
125 Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 831 (9th Cir. 1997). 
126 Id. at 822. The complaint alleged that Neal, during a two-day period, 
kidnapped and robbed the victim and forced the victim to perform sexual acts on 
a juvenile. Id. Additionally, the indictment alleged that Neal sexually assaulted 
the victim. Id. He was also indicted for kidnapping a second victim and sexually 
assaulting her as well. Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 823. 
129 Id. at 831. 
130 Id. at 829 (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). In 
Sandin, Conner, a defendant convicted of numerous crimes including murder, 
alleged that his procedural due process rights were violated because he was 
denied the ability to present witnesses at a disciplinary hearing. Sandin, 515 U.S. 
at 474-76. The hearing resulted in Conner being sentenced to thirty days’ 
disciplinary segregation. Id. at 475. The Supreme Court held that Conner’s 
discipline in segregated confinement did not present the type of atypical, 
significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty 
interest. Id. at 486. 
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interest.”131 These “increasingly popular ‘Megan’s laws’” 
stigmatize individuals classified as sex offenders insofar as such 
laws require that these individuals register with law enforcement 
officials and information about the offenders may subsequently be 
released to the public.132 
In determining that Neal had a protected liberty interest, the 
Ninth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Vitek v. 
Jones.133 In Vitek, inmates challenged the constitutionality of a 
Nebraska statute that authorized correctional officials to classify 
certain inmates as “mentally ill” without a hearing and to 
subsequently transfer them to mental hospitals for involuntary 
confinement.134 The Supreme Court held that the liberty interest 
included both the characterization of the inmate as mentally ill and 
the transfer of the inmate to the mental hospital.135 The Court also 
concluded that an inmate’s criminal conviction and sentence, 
alone, do not authorize the state to classify him as mentally ill and 
subject him to involuntary confinement without affording him due 
process protections.136 The Ninth Circuit found the parallels 
between Vitek and the Neal case “striking.”137 First, Hawaii’s sex 
                                                          
131 Neal, 131 F.3d at 829. The court, however, emphasized the stigmatizing 
consequences of sex offender registration statutes that authorize law 
enforcement officials to release information to the public. Id. See also People v. 
Bell, No. 3610-80, 2003 Misc. LEXIS 884, at *15 (“[A] defendant’s private 
interest, his liberty interest in not being stigmatized as a sexually violent 
predator, is substantial.”). 
132 Neal, 131 F.3d at 829. 
133 Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 828 (9th Cir. 1997). 
134 Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 484-85 (1980). 
135 Id. at 487-88 (affirming the district court’s holding that “characterizing 
Jones as a mentally ill patient” and transferring him to a mental hospital had 
“some stigmatizing” consequences that, when coupled with the mandatory 
behavior modification treatment that Jones would have to undergo, “constituted 
a major change in the conditions of confinement amounting to a ‘grievous loss’ 
that should not be imposed without the opportunity for notice and an adequate 
hearing”). 
136 Id. at 489-90. The Supreme Court noted that prisoners facing 
involuntary transfer to a mental hospital must receive notice so that the prisoner 
may be able to challenge the action and understand what is happening to him. Id. 
at 496. 
137 Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 828-29 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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offender registration statute authorized correctional officials to 
classify an inmate as a sex offender without a hearing.138 
Additionally, inmates classified as sex offenders were required to 
complete a treatment program and confess to past sex offenses to 
be eligible for parole.139 Therefore, the court could “hardly 
conceive of a state’s action bearing more ‘stigmatizing 
consequences’ than the labeling of a prison inmate as a sex 
offender.”140 
Using the analysis employed by the court in Neal, the 
Gunderson court should have held that because classifying 
Gunderson as a sex offender imposes substantial burdens on him, a 
protected liberty interest is implicated.141 Like defendant Neal, 
Gunderson was required to register as a sex offender, even though 
all charges of sexual misconduct had been dismissed.142 Although 
Gunderson was not required to complete a mandatory treatment 
program, he still encounters substantial hardships from his duty to 
register as a predatory offender. First, as a consequence of his duty 
to register, Gunderson is not only required to register as a 
predatory offender in Minnesota, but he must also register in each 
state where he works or attends school.143 Gunderson’s foreseeable 
reluctance to register as a sex offender in additional jurisdictions 
restricts his mobility for the duration of his registration because 
while Gunderson is not legally prohibited from leaving Minnesota, 
he must comply with the registration laws of any state to which he 
moves.144 Therefore, given that most jurisdictions provide for 
                                                          
138 Id. at 829. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Like Minnesota, registrants in Hawaii must provide law enforcement 
officials with a recent photograph, verified fingerprints, all names and aliases 
used by the sex offender, the legal address, mailing address, and any temporary 
residence where the sex offender resides, the names and addresses of current 
employers, the names and addresses of educational institutions, and the year, 
make, model, color, and license plate of all vehicles owned or operated by the 
sex offender. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 845E-2(b)(1)-(2), (5)-(7) (Michie 2003). 
142 Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639, 642 (8th Cir. 2003). 
143 MINN. STAT. § 243.166.4a(4)-(5) (2003). 
144 MINN. STAT. § 243.166.9 (2003) (providing that when Minnesota 
accepts an offender from another state under the interstate compact, acceptance 
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public dissemination of information contained in the registry, 
Gunderson will be significantly deterred from leaving Minnesota, 
which does not provide for automatic public dissemination.145 
Additionally, sex offender registration burdens registrants by 
creating psychological barriers to travel.146 Should Gunderson 
violate any of the provisions of his registration, he is guilty of a 
felony and is subject to a mandatory minimum prison sentence of 
one year.147 
Furthermore, in Minnesota if a registrant is not in compliance 
for over thirty days or if he does not provide his primary or 
secondary address to law enforcement, his information including a 
photograph can be released to the public.148 The stigmatizing 
consequences can certainly be recognized in Gunderson’s case 
where, although he was dismissed of all charges of sexual assault, 
he is included on a sex offender registry and information 
concerning an offense he was never convicted of may be released 
to the public.149 As the Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized, 
                                                          
is conditional on the offender agreeing to register under Minnesota’s predatory 
offender registration statute). See also Lewis, supra note 57, at 113 (noting that 
sex offender laws “burden the ability of released offenders to relocate”). 
145 See supra Part II.A notes 70-73 and accompanying text (noting that 
contrary to Minnesota, most states provide for public dissemination of 
information contained in the registry). 
146 Lewis, supra note 57, at 113-14. Indeed as noted by Judge Agid in State 
v. Taylor: 
[The requirement of registration] surely will have a chilling effect on 
the [released offender’s] freedom of choice to move to a new place. It 
is inconceivable to think that one who must, as his first act, go to local 
law enforcement and announce that he is a felon convicted of a sex 
offense will not be deterred from moving in order to avoid divulging 
that ignominious event. 
Id. (quoting State v. Taylor, 835 P.2d 245, 250 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (Agid, J., 
dissenting)). 
147 MINN. STAT. § 243.166.5(a)-(b) (2003). Gunderson was not subject to 
mandatory incarceration following his conviction. Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 641-
642 (noting that Gunderson originally received three years probation with a 
stayed sentence of fifteen months imprisonment). 
148 MINN. STAT. § 243.166.7a (2003) (emphasis added). 
149 Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639 (8th Cir. 2003) (upholding 
Gunderson’s duty to register under MINN. STAT. § 243.166 (2003)). 
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“being labeled a ‘predatory offender’ is injurious to one’s 
reputation.”150 Indeed, “imputing criminal behavior to an 
individual is generally considered defamatory per se.”151 
Minnesota’s sex offender registry clearly stigmatizes offenders on 
the list insofar as it suggests that they are individuals convicted of 
predatory offenses.152 In Gunderson’s case, law enforcement 
authorities have branded him a predatory offender although he was 
not convicted of a predatory offense.153 Gunderson must 
acknowledge his status as a predatory offender for ten years in 
spite of the fact that the complaint charging him with a sexual 
offense was dismissed in its entirety.154 Therefore, because of the 
potential for criminal sanction, the limitations on mobility, the 
additional obligations imposed on Gunderson, and the stigmatizing 
consequences of being labeled as a sex offender, registration as a 
predatory offender imposes on Gunderson “atypical and significant 
hardship,” which the Ninth Circuit held invokes due process 
protections.155 
                                                          
150 Boutin, 591 N.W.2d 711 at 718. 
151 Id. (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. at 697). See also Neal v. Shimoda, 
131 F.3d 818, 829 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting the “stigmatizing consequences of 
being labeled a sex offender”). 
152 See Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 271 F.3d 38, 54-55 (2d Cir. 2001), 
rev’d on other grounds, 538 U.S. 1 (2003) “Publication of the Connecticut Sex 
Offender Registry plainly stigmatizes the people listed on it insofar as it asserts 
that they are persons convicted of crimes characterized by the State as sexual 
offenses.” Id. 
153 Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639, 642 (8th Cir. 2003). 
154 Doe v. Attorney General, 426 Mass. 136, 149 (1997) (Fried, J., 
concurring) (noting the distinct constitutional dangers inherent in registration 
requirements as opposed to community notification provisions). While 
community notification pertains to action on the part of law enforcement, 
registration “forces an action on the person required to register. It is a 
continuing, intrusive, and humiliating regulation of the person himself.” Id. at 
150. 
155 See Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 829 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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2. Gunderson’s Identification of a Protected Liberty Interest Under 
the Stigma-Plus Test 
In determining what procedural due process protections are 
owed to an individual subject to a predatory offender registration 
statute, some jurisdictions have examined whether a defendant has 
suffered a loss of reputation in conjunction with the removal of a 
protected status.156 This examination is often referred to as the 
“stigma-plus” test.157 Damage to reputation, even if defamatory, is 
insufficient to invoke the procedural protections of the due process 
clause.158 Reputational damage must be combined with a tangible 
element, such as loss of employment, to rise to the level of a 
protectible property interest.159 The tangible element, however, is 
not required to “meet some threshold of substantiality.”160 
Registration duties imposed on the offender constitute a “plus” 
factor under the “stigma plus” test when those obligations alter the 
defendant’s legal status, are “governmental in nature,” and are 
“extensive and onerous.”161 In addition to the reputational damage 
suffered by Gunderson, compliance with Minnesota’s sex offender 
registration statute alters Gunderson’s legal status.162 First, 
                                                          
156 See, e.g., State v. Pierce, 794 A.2d 1123, 1132 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002). 
157 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976). The stigma-plus analysis was 
first articulated by the Supreme Court in Paul v. Davis. Justice Rehnquist noted 
that an individual’s “interest in reputation . . . is neither ‘liberty’ nor ‘property’ 
guaranteed against state deprivation without due process of the law.” Id. 
158 Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 644 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 
(1976)). 
159 Id. 
160 Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 271 F.3d 38, 54-55 (2d Cir. 2001), rev’d on 
other grounds, 538 U.S. 1 (2003). 
161 Id. at 57 (affirming that the registration duties imposed on the plaintiff 
constituted a “plus” factor because those obligations altered the plaintiff’s legal 
status, were “governmental in nature,” and the registration duties imposed were 
extensive and onerous). 
162 Doe v. Pataki, 3 F. Supp. 2d 456, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). Given that 
registrants must comply with the registration requirements and are subject to 
criminal prosecution for non-compliance, “there can be no genuine doubt that 
registration alters the legal status of all offenders subject to the Act for a 
minimum of ten years and, for some permanently.” Id. See Doe, 271 F.3d at 53 
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Gunderson’s relationship with the criminal justice system has been 
extended for an additional ten years, and “the extent of his contact 
with the state has increased significantly.”163 Failure to comply 
with registration obligations is punishable as an independent felony 
offense.164 In addition, Gunderson is likely to be under the constant 
supervision of local law enforcement officials.165 While the police 
cannot arrest a registered sex offender based solely on his inclusion 
within the registry, they can pressure him to come to the police 
station and question him as a suspect.166 For example, if law 
enforcement is investigating a sexual offense that occurred in the 
vicinity of Gunderson’s home, there is little to prevent the 
investigating authorities from questioning Gunderson, a registered 
predatory offender, in connection with the crime. “If he is 
suspected in connection with every sex crime in the area where he 
lives, the costs to [his] liberty as well as the emotional and 
financial costs are likely to be high.”167 As a direct consequence of 
his placement on the predatory offender registration statute, unique 
burdens are placed on Gunderson that ordinary citizens are not 
required to endure. 
In addition to altering a defendant’s legal status, registration 
duties are undoubtedly governmental in nature.168 The Fourteenth 
                                                          
(stating that “the imposition on a person of a new set of legal duties that, if 
disregarded, subject him . . . to felony prosecution, constitute a change of that 
person’s status under state law”). 
163 See Doe v. Williams, 167 F. Supp. 2d 45, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding 
that “a sex offender’s status has undergone a fundamental change” under 
Washington, D.C.’s Sexual Offender Registration Act considering that “his 
relationship with the criminal justice system has been prolonged for at least ten 
years, if not for life; and the extent of his contact with the State has increased 
significantly”). 
164 MINN. STAT. § 243.166.5 (2003). 
165 See Lewis, supra note 57, at 105 (noting that “sex offender laws will 
likely make former offenders perpetual suspects of sex crimes committed in the 
areas in which they live”). 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 106. 
168 Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 271 F.3d 38, 50 (2d Cir. 2001). The Due 
Process Clause was established to guard against abuses in governmental power. 
Id. at 56. 
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Amendment is implicated where a government official or agency is 
able to “impose a loss” because of its unique status.169 In Doe v. 
Dep’t of Pub. Safety, the Second Circuit found that registration 
duties were governmental in nature “insofar as they could not be 
imposed by a private actor in a position analogous to the state 
defendants.”170 Because the BCA is entrusted with ensuring a 
registrant’s compliance with Minnesota’s Predatory Offender 
Registration Act and is given authority to “impose a loss” on 
Gunderson, these registration duties are governmental in nature.171 
Finally, registration obligations can be “extensive and 
onerous.”172 The Appellate Court of Connecticut in State v. Pierce 
found that the defendant satisfied the “stigma plus” test given the 
burdensome requirements of Connecticut’s sex offender 
registration statute and thus warranted the protections of 
procedural due process.173 Connecticut law requires registrants to 
verify their addresses annually for ten years.174 If an offender fails 
to return an address verification form, a warrant may be issued for 
the registrant’s arrest.175 The registrant must notify the 
Commissioner of Public Safety five days in advance of an 
anticipated change of address.176 Registrants must provide blood 
samples for DNA analysis and photographs of the registrants must 
be taken whenever the Commissioner so requests.177 Additionally, 
Connecticut law mandates that the offender register in all states 
where he regularly travels.178 Connecticut law imposes a maximum 
                                                          
169 Id. at 56. 
170 Id. 
171 MINN. STAT. § 243.166.4(e)(2), .7a (2003) (providing that all registration 
information including address verification forms must be submitted to the BCA 
and if registrants are out of compliance with the statute for over thirty days, the 
BCA may release registration information to the public). 
172 Id. (noting that the provisions of Connecticut’s sex offender law are 
“extensive and onerous”). 
173 State v. Pierce, 794 A.2d 1123, 1133 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002) (upholding 
Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 271 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
174 Pierce, 794 A.2d at 1133. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
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five-year prison term if a registered offender fails to abide by any 
of these obligations.179 The Pierce court found that these “onerous 
requirements” clearly established a “plus” factor in the stigma-plus 
analysis.180 
With few exceptions, the provisions of Connecticut’s sex 
offender registration statute mirror those of Minnesota’s statute.181 
The penalties for non-compliance are identical.182 Both states 
mandate registration in additional jurisdictions if the registrant 
works or attends school in a different state.183 Such ongoing 
obligations are significant restrictions on a registrant’s liberty and 
freedom.184 Thus, while the Eighth Circuit alleges that the burdens 
                                                          
179 Pierce, 794 A.2d at 1133. 
180 Id. 
181 Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-254(a) (2003) (mandating registration 
for a period of ten years and a five-day notice prior to any anticipated move) 
with MINN. STAT. § 243.166.1(4)(b)(3), MINN. STAT. § 243.166.3(b) (2003) 
(mandating ten-year registration for predatory offenders and five-day notice 
prior to any anticipated move). A fundamental difference between the two 
statutes is that Minnesota treats registration information as private data whereas 
Connecticut considers registration information a public record and makes 
registry information available to the public through the Internet. See MINN. 
STAT. § 243.166.7 (2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-258(a)(1) (2003). 
182 Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-254(b) (2003) (violation of 
registration provisions constitutes a Class D felony carrying a five year term of 
imprisonment) with MINN. STAT. § 243.166.5 (2003) (violation of any 
registration provisions is a felony subjecting a registrant to a maximum prison 
sentence of five years). 
183 Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-254(a) (2003) (providing that “if any 
person who is subject to registration under this section is employed in another 
state, carries on a vocation in another state or is a student in another state, such 
person shall notify the Commissioner of Public Safety and shall also register 
with an appropriate agency in that state”) with MINN. STAT. § 243.166.3(d) 
(2003) (requiring a registrant who works or attends school outside of Minnesota 
to “register as a predatory offender in the state where the person works or 
attends school). 
184 Boutin, 591 N.W.2d 711, 721 (Minn. 1999) (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
Judge Anderson noted that “the consequences of [Minnesota’s] Section 243.166 
are serious” and it is because of grave implications that procedural due process 
must be followed. Id. Additionally, Judge Anderson made these findings when 
the penalty for non-compliance was merely a gross misdemeanor and not a 
felony. Id. 
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imposed by Minnesota’s statute are minimal, the statute, in fact, 
imposes conditions that are both “rigorous and confining.”185 
Therefore, the registration duties imposed on Gunderson under the 
Minnesota statute constitute a “plus” factor, and he should be 
afforded with the procedural protections of due process.186 
The Gunderson court, however, dismissed the similarity of the 
two statutes, stating that Connecticut, unlike Minnesota, provides 
for public dissemination of registration data. Yet neither Pierce nor 
Doe addressed this factor in their analyses; indeed, the Pierce court 
affirmed that its holding was limited to the registration component 
of the statute as opposed to the disclosure component.187 
The Gunderson court also stated that because the Second’s 
Circuit’s decision in Doe v. Dept. of Public Safety was reversed by 
the Supreme Court, any persuasive value of that opinion has since 
been eviscerated.188 The Second Circuit held that Connecticut’s 
statute violated the Due Process Clause because registrants were 
not afforded a prior hearing to determine whether they were likely 
to be dangerous upon release into the community.189 The Supreme 
                                                          
185 See id. (noting that Minnesota’s section 243.166 imposes on registrants 
conditions that are rigorous and confining). 
186 Cf. State v. Pierce, 794 A.2d 1123, 1133 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002) (holding 
that the defendant satisfied the “plus” factor of the “stigma plus” test where he 
must verify his address annually for ten years, notify the Commissioner of 
Public Safety within five days whenever he changes his address, and is subject 
to a five-year prison term for non-compliance with these obligations). 
187 Pierce, 794 A.2d at 1133. See Gunderson, 339 F.3d 639 (8th Cir. 2003). 
Contrary to the court’s belief, Minnesota’s statute does provide for public 
dissemination of registration information if an offender is out of compliance for 
over thirty days or if the offender has failed to provide a primary or secondary 
address. MINN. STAT. § 243.166. 7a (2003). 
188 Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 644 (citing Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 
U.S. 1 (2003)). See Gwinn v. Awmiller, 2004 U.S. App. Lexis 345 n.6 (10th Cir. 
2004) (finding that the Supreme Court’s holding in Dep’t of Public Safety does 
not foreclose a procedural due process claim brought by an individual who has 
not been convicted of a sexual offense because the Court’s holding was limited 
to individuals convicted of enumerated sexual offenses). 
189 Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 271 F.3d 38, 49-50 (2d Cir. 2001), rev’d, 
538 U.S. 1 (2003). See Mathews v. Eldridge 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (holding 
that once a liberty interest is implicated, due process requires, at a minimum, 
notice and an opportunity to be heard). 
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Court reversed the Doe decision, finding that “due process does 
not require the opportunity to prove a fact that is not material” to 
the state’s statute.190 The Supreme Court pointed out that 
Connecticut based the registration requirement on the fact of 
previous conviction, not on whether convicted sex offenders were 
likely to be currently dangerous.191 “The law’s requirements turn 
on an offender’s conviction alone.”192 Respondent Doe was a 
convicted sexual offender.193 Therefore, whether Doe was 
currently dangerous was not material to the statutory scheme.194 
What was material to the statutory scheme was Doe’s conviction—
“a fact that [Doe] has already had a procedurally safeguarded 
opportunity to contest.”195 Gunderson, unlike Doe, has never been 
convicted of a sexual offense, and whether Gunderson’s conviction 
arose from the same set of circumstances as his charged criminal 
sexual conduct presents an issue of material fact.196 The Eighth 
Circuit improperly distinguished Doe and unreasonably refused to 
apply Doe’s principle because unlike Doe, Gunderson was never 
provided an opportunity to contest the imposition of the predatory 
offender label.197 Therefore, due process entitles an individual 
included on a sex offender registry who has not been convicted of 
a sexual offense to a hearing to establish a material fact.198 
                                                          
190 Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S at 4. 
191 Id. at 7. See also Chad Kinsella, State Government News May 1, 2003, 
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS No.5 Vol.46 (May 1, 2003) (noting that the 
Supreme Court found that the dispositive factor in being listed on Connecticut’s 
sex offender registry was that an individual had been convicted of committing a 
sex offense). 
192 Doe, 538 U.S. at 7. 
193 Id. at 5. 
194 Id. at 7. 
195 Id. (emphasis added). 
196 See Murphy v. Wood, 545 N.W.2d 52, 54 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) 
(stating that “whether Murphy’s convictions arose from the same set of 
circumstances as his charged sexual misconduct presents an issue of material 
fact”). 
197 Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 271 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2001); Gunderson v. 
Hvass, 339 F.3d 639 (8th Cir. 2003). 
198 See Doe, 538 U.S. at 7. 
CEGLIANMACRO.DOC 4/23/2004  12:58 PM 
 REGISTERING NON-PREDATORY OFFENDERS 877 
3. Deprivation of Gunderson’s Procedural Due Process 
Protections 
Given the harmful implications of denying a protected liberty 
interest, defendants like Gunderson who have never been 
convicted of an enumerated sexual offense must be accorded due 
process protections.199 As noted in Neal, an offender who has an 
identified protected liberty interest should receive advance written 
notice of the claimed violation.200 Gunderson was not notified until 
nearly a year after his conviction of his obligation to register as a 
predatory offender.201 Gunderson’s registration requirement was 
not stated on the record during his plea colloquy, nor is there any 
evidence to indicate he was made aware of his obligation to 
register prior to the execution of his plea bargain.202 
Additionally, an offender should receive a written statement by 
the fact-finders as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for 
requiring registration.203 Gunderson, much like Neal, was 
classified as a sex offender based solely on the information 
contained in his indictment and pre-sentence report.204 
                                                          
199 See Fullmer v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 207 F. Supp. 2d 650, 
659-61 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (holding that the stigma of being falsely labeled on 
the state’s sexual offender registry, coupled with the “obligations of registration 
and the attendant penalties for non-compliance” were sufficient to implicate a 
liberty interest). 
200 Id. (noting that for “the minimum requirements of procedural due 
process are to be satisfied” the defendant must receive an “advance written 
notice of the claimed violation”). 
201 Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639, 642 (8th Cir. 2003). Gunderson was 
made aware of his duty to register as a predatory offender following a violation 
of his probation that occurred nearly a year after his conviction. Id. 
202 Id. See Larry J. Richards, Criminal Procedure—Plea Withdrawal: 
Grounds for Allowance—North Dakota Adopts the Minority Rule Regarding 
Court Notification of a Sex Offender’s Duty to Register: State v. Breiner, 562 
N.W.2d 565 (N.D. 1997), 74 N.D. L. REV. 157, 168 (1998) (noting that the 
North Dakota Supreme Court held in State v. Breiner that trial courts must 
notify defendants of their obligations to register prior to accepting a guilty plea 
so as to ensure that the plea agreement has a factual basis and is voluntary). 
203 See Neal, 131 F.3d at 831 (holding that these two elements are essential 
if the minimum requirements of procedural due process are to be met). 
204 Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 642-43. See Neal, 131 F.3d at 822 (noting that 
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Gunderson’s record lacked any specific findings as to the reasons 
for his classification as a sex offender.205 An indictment, without 
more, is an insufficient basis for imposing registration 
requirements.206 “As tempting as it may be to make . . . finding[s] 
based upon police reports and unverified statements, to do so is 
improper.”207 
B.  Substantive Due Process 
Substantive due process rights protect individuals against 
governmental power that is either arbitrarily or oppressively 
exercised.208 In analyzing a substantive due process claim, 
infringements on personal liberty must be weighed against the 
state’s desire to maintain stability in society.209 If Minnesota’s 
predatory offender registration statute implicates a fundamental 
right, the state must advance a legitimate and compelling interest 
for abridging that right.210 The Minnesota Supreme Court has, 
however, determined that the sex offender registration statute is 
non-punitive, and therefore, because the statute does not implicate 
fundamental right, the statute must only be rationally related to a 
                                                          
because Neal’s indictment and pre-sentence report alleged that he engaged in 
sexual misconduct, he was classified as a “sex offender”). 
205 Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 642-43. 
206 Neal, 131 F.3d at 831. 
207 Boutin, 591 N.W.2d at 721 (Anderson, J., dissenting). See also Murphy 
v. Wood, 545 N.W.2d 52, 54 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996). The court held that a 
factual record was necessary to determine whether Murphy’s sexual assault 
arose from the same set of circumstances as his convictions for aggravated 
robbery and assault. Id. at 53. The court held that a copy of the criminal 
complaint which the defendant denied was insufficient to establish a factual 
record as to whether the sexual assault charge arose from the same set of 
circumstances as the robbery and assault convictions. Id. 
208 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (noting that “touchstone 
of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of 
government”). 
209 Lewis, supra note 57, at 102 (noting that “if the individual liberty 
interests of former sex offenders outweigh the state interests in crime prevention 
and law enforcement, the [sex offender registration act] violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment guarantee of substantive due process”). 
210 Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639, 643 (8th Cir. 2003). 
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legitimate governmental purpose.211 While keeping track of 
predatory offenders and protecting public safety are legitimate 
governmental objectives, Minnesota’s Predatory Offender 
Registration Statute is irrationally related to these objectives 
because it mandates registration for individuals like Gunderson 
whose sex offense charges have been dismissed and withdrawn. 
Sex offender registration statutes have been justified on a 
number of grounds. First, it is asserted that registration laws are 
necessary because sex offenders have a higher risk of re-offending 
after release from custody than other criminals.212 Second, 
                                                          
211 The Minnesota Supreme Court held, in Boutin v. LaFleur, that the 
registration statute was non-punitive. 591 N.W.2d 711, 717 (Minn. 1999). To 
reach this conclusion, the Boutin Court, along with most state and federal courts, 
have applied the Mendoza-Martinez balancing test. Id. at 717. The Mendoza-
Martinez balancing approach is utilized to determine whether a statute was 
intended to be regulatory or punitive when the legislature has not clearly 
indicated its intent. Id. In Kennedy v. Martinez-Mendoza, the Supreme Court 
determined that factors used to determine legislative intent include: 
whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, 
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it 
comes into play only on a finding of a scienter, whether its operation 
will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and 
deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, 
whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected 
is assignable for it and whether it appears excessive in relation to the 
alternative purpose assigned. 
Boutin, 591 N.W.2d at 717 (citing Kennedy v. Martinez-Mendoza, 372 U.S. 144 
(1963)). In determining that the registration statute was regulatory, the court 
noted that it does not require an affirmative disability or restraint, but that it only 
requires the offender to register with law enforcement and to inform the state of 
any change of address. Id. Additionally, such registration statutes have not 
historically been regarded as punishment. Id. The Boutin court also noted that 
the registration statute does not promote the traditional aims of punishment 
because it does not involve confinement and that it is not intended to exact 
retribution. Id. The court concluded that the statute did not implicate Boutin’s 
fundamental rights. Id. But see In re Reed, 33 Cal. 3d 914 (Cal. 1983) (finding 
California’s sex offender registration statute punitive under the Martinez-
Mendoza factors). 
212 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-903 (Michie 2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 
45-33-21 (2004). A recent study issued by the Justice Department, however, 
revealed that sex offenders are less likely to be re-arrested after their release 
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registration laws are considered an invaluable tool in protecting the 
public from sex offenders.213 Third, the privacy interests of 
convicted sex offenders are considered less important than the 
government’s interest in public safety.214 Each of these 
justifications, however, presupposes that the individual subject to 
the registration statute is in fact a sexual offender. It is irrational in 
light of those objectives to classify an individual as a predatory 
offender when the complaint charging that individual with a sexual 
offense has been dismissed and withdrawn by the prosecution. 
Contrary to the Magistrate’s assertion, inclusion in the 
predatory offender registry of persons who are not predators is a 
fatal constitutional defect.215 Designating Gunderson a sex 
offender when there is no sexual element to his crime leads to an 
illogical and absurd result.216 As it stands, the statute is over-
inclusive given that it demands registration of persons convicted of 
only non-sexual offenses and thereby fails to achieve the primary 
                                                          
from prison than other criminals. U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, Recidivism of Sex Offenders Released from Prison in 1994, (2003) 
available at http://www.ojp.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf. Of 9,691 men 
convicted of various sex offenses, only 43 percent were re-arrested within three 
years as compared to 68 percent for all other former inmates. Id. See also MARY 
ANN FARKAS & GEORGE B. PALERMO, THE DILEMMA OF THE SEX OFFENDER 
171-72 (Charles C. Thomas 2001) (noting that there is no clear evidence to 
indicate whether sex offenders have higher recidivism rates than other 
offenders). 
213 Klaas Kids, supra note 3. The articulated purpose of Minnesota’s Sex 
Offender Registration Statute is aimed at “assist[ing] law enforcement in 
keeping track of predatory offenders and protect[ing] public safety.” Minnesota 
House of Representatives, House Research: Predatory Offender Registration, 
available at http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/ssinfo/ssporeg.htm (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2004). 
214 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-903 (Michie 2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 
45-33-21 (2004). 
215 See Magistrate’s Report at *25 (asserting that “the fact that such a 
registration policy may, in fact, require the inclusion of persons who are not 
predators, is not a fatal Constitutional defect”). 
216 See State v. Reine, 2003 Ohio 50, ¶ 22 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (holding 
that labeling individuals as “sexually oriented offenders” is unreasonable and 
arbitrary when their offense involved no sexual motivation or purpose”). 
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purpose of the statute—to protect the public from sex offenders.217 
Indeed, the primary purpose of the statute is disserved by sweeping 
within its provisions individuals who are clearly not predatory 
offenders because these offenders pose no risk to society.218 
Nothing prevents the legislature from imposing registration 
requirements on all convicted felons.219 However, “it is in the 
misnaming or mis-characterization, of the offense that is 
unreasonable and arbitrary.”220 Minnesota’s predatory offender 
registration statute violates substantive due process rights even 
under a rational basis review because it irrationally classifies an 
individual as a predatory offender when all predatory offense 
charges have been withdrawn due to a complete lack of physical 
evidence.221 By enacting the 1993 Amendments, the Minnesota 
Legislature “was attempting to insure the registration of all 
predatory offenders including those who take advantage of 
favorable plea bargains.”222 While this is certainly a valid 
legislative goal, it is highly doubtful that through these 
amendments the legislature intended to expand the predatory 
offender registry to include persons who did not commit a sexual 
offense. 
                                                          
217 See MINN. STAT. § 243.166 (2003). 
218 Reine, 2003 Ohio at ¶ 20. As noted by Connecticut State Senator Donald 
E. Williams, co-chair of the judiciary committee and majority whip, having a 
registry where 75 percent of those on the list are not sexual predators is not a 
great help to individual citizens or local law enforcement who are trying to be 
apprised of those who will be dangerous to the community. Turner, supra note 
78. 
219 Reine, 2003 Ohio at ¶ 21. 
220 Id. at ¶ 23 (noting a hypothetical situation where a legislature, in an 
effort to protect public safety, enacted a statute designating all persons convicted 
of felonies as “murderers,” with registration and notification requirements so 
that neighbors would be notified that John Jones, a “murderer,” is living on their 
block when in fact John Jones was convicted of an esoteric election-law felony). 
221 See Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639, 641 (8th Cir. 2003). 
222 Magistrate’s Report, supra note 47 at *25. 
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IV.  ADDITIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF MINNESOTA’S PREDATORY 
OFFENDER REGISTRATION STATUTE 
In addition to the constitutional impediments posed by 
Minnesota’s Predatory Offender Registration Statute, the statute 
raises several other problematic consequences. First, by mandating 
registration based solely on the charges contained in the initial 
complaint, the prosecution possesses an unchecked ability to 
determine whether a defendant will ultimately be required to 
register. Even if there is little evidence to support this charge, so 
long as the prosecution has charged a sexual offense, an individual 
will be required to register as a predatory offender. Additionally, 
Minnesota’s Predatory Offender Registration Statute will lead to 
the ultimate decline of plea bargaining given that the threat of 
compulsory registration leads many defendants to seek jury trials 
rather than plead guilty. 
A.  Unfettered Prosecutorial Discretion 
An alarming consequence of Minnesota’s Predatory Offender 
Registration Statute is the enormous degree of “unchecked power” 
given to the prosecution.223 Registration duties arise solely from 
the allegations contained in the original complaint.224 Regardless 
of whether the complaint is subsequently dismissed or amended, if 
the original complaint charged an offender with a registerable 
sexual offense, that offender is required to register as a predatory 
offender for a minimum of ten years.225 As noted by Judge Randall 
in State v. Newell: 
                                                          
223 See Minnesota v. Newell, 2002 WL 31253657, at *6 (Minn. Oct. 8, 
2002) (affirming the defendant’s duty to register as a predatory offender while 
appreciating “the enormity of the potential unchecked power this statute, as 
written, places in the hands of the prosecution”). 
224 Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 643 (noting that since Gunderson’s original 
complaint charged a sexual offense he was required to register as a predatory 
offender in accordance with Section 243.166). 
225 MINN. STAT. § 243.166.1(b)(3) (2003) (requiring an offender to register 
as a predatory offender until ten years have elapsed since that individual was 
released from confinement). 
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In some criminal sexual conduct cases, the state’s case 
against the defendant weakens so significantly that the state 
will agree to bargain down from a serious sexual-assault 
charge to a misdemeanor such as simple assault . . . . 
Defendants may consider it prudent to accept a plea-of-
guilty to a lower-level misdemeanor charge rather than go 
through the uncertainty of trial on an egregious sexual 
assault charge. Yet, the stigma of the original charge 
remains (meaning the registration requirement), even 
though it is now self-evident that the original charge did not 
result in a conviction . . . . Put another way, this is one of 
the few times in American jurisprudence where the “charge 
is the conviction,” meaning that once you are charged with 
an enumerated felony under the statute, you are convicted 
of having to register.226 
While the prosecutor has unrestrained discretion to determine what 
offenses to charge in the indictment, however, once the indictment 
is filed, the prosecutor herself is unable to withdraw the 
registration requirements.227 As the Gunderson case illustrates, 
once a prosecutor issues a complaint that contains a registerable 
offense, even if the prosecutor subsequently withdraws the original 
complaint, an individual must still register as a predatory offender 
based solely on the allegations contained in the original withdrawn 
complaint.228 This places significant power in the hands of 
prosecutors, allowing them to impose severe penalties associated 
with registration compliance without ever putting forth any 
evidence to prove that the individual committed the charged sexual 
offense. 
B.  Effects on the Plea Bargaining System 
In addition, Minnesota’s Predatory Offender Registration 
                                                          
226 State v. Newell, 2002 Minn. App. Lexis 1153, *7 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2002). 
227 Gunderson, 339 F.3d at 642 (asserting that registration is required so 
long as a predatory offense is charged even if the predatory offense charge is 
subsequently withdrawn from the complaint). 
228 Id. 
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Statute will lead to the gradual decline of plea bargaining.229 
Defendants who plead guilty to non-predatory offenses will 
rightfully fear that they may be subject to mandatory registration if 
the original complaint charged a predatory offense.230 This 
apprehension is well-placed, given that the Minnesota Supreme 
Court operating under the majority view has determined that the 
statutory duty to register as a sexual offender is a collateral rather 
than a direct consequence of a guilty plea.231 “For a guilty plea to 
be intelligent, the defendant must be aware of the relevant 
circumstances and direct consequences of the plea.”232 A direct 
consequence of a plea has a definite, immediate, and automatic 
effect on a defendant’s term and condition of sentence.233 Because 
most states find that the requirement to register is regulatory rather 
than punitive, registration requirements are not considered to be a 
direct consequence of a guilty plea.234 Thus, unlike a direct 
consequence, these jurisdictions do not require that a defendant be 
warned of a collateral consequence before entering a guilty plea.235 
                                                          
229 See Turner, supra note 78 (noting that the plea bargaining process will 
be slowed down by a defendant’s apprehension that he will be required to 
register as a sex offender). 
230 Id. 
231 Kaiser v. State, 621 N.W.2d 49, 53 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). A direct 
consequence of a guilty plea is a consequence that flows “definitely, 
immediately and automatically” from the guilty plea. Id. The court in Kaiser 
held that because the predatory offender registration requirement is regulatory 
and non-punitive, it is collateral to the plea agreement, and therefore, a 
defendant cannot withdraw his plea agreement simply because he was not made 
aware of his obligation to register as a predatory offender. Id. 
232 Id. 
233 Richards, supra note 202, at 161-62. 
234 Id. 
235 Id. at 168 (noting that “many appellate courts view the consequence of 
registration as a sexual offender to be collateral, so that a trial court’s failure to 
advise defendants of the need to register does not constitute grounds for 
allowing a withdrawal of a guilty plea”). But see In re Birch, 515 P.2d 12, 17 
(Cal. 1973) (finding registration as a sex offender to be a direct consequence of 
a guilty plea, given that registration subjects registrants to “continual police 
surveillance” and can result in an “ignominious badge” that can last for a 
lifetime). Because registration prolongs a defendant’s relationship with the state, 
and because it subjects a defendant to an independent felony offense and to 
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Unfortunately, the failure to warn a defendant of his duty to 
register does not allow the defendant to subsequently withdraw his 
plea.236 
If states can arbitrarily impose registration requirements on 
defendants, unbeknownst to them, after a plea bargain has been 
struck, defendants will be wary of entering into plea negotiations, 
and will opt instead to seek a jury trial. In an amicus brief filed in 
the case of In re Reed, the Los Angeles City Attorney asserted that 
the threat of mandatory registration leads defendants to seek jury 
trials rather than plead guilty, even if evidence of their guilt is 
overwhelming.237 Through a jury trial, a prosecutor is forced to 
advance evidence of the sexual offense and if the jury finds this 
evidence unconvincing, a defendant will be relieved of the 
registration requirement. In a system where approximately 96 
percent of cases are resolved through plea bargains, such a 
disruption could have a devastating effect in terms of judicial 
economy.238 If a state deems it necessary to label a defendant as a 
sex offender and to subject him to registration requirements, the 
state should pursue prison terms that correspond to the offense, 
rather than dismissing sex offense charges pursuant to a plea 
bargain and yet still subjecting the defendant to registration 
                                                          
constant police surveillance, registration should be considered as a direct 
consequence of a guilty plea. Therefore, defendants should be notified of the 
requirement to register as a predatory offender prior to entering a guilty plea. 
236 See Kaiser v. State, 641 N.W.2d 900 (Minn. 2002), construed in the 
Magistrate’s Report, supra note 47. Indeed, Gunderson alleged that at the time 
of his plea, he was not informed of his obligation to register as a predatory 
offender and that if he had been informed of this obligation, he would never 
have accepted this plea bargain. Magistrate’s Report, supra note 47, at n.5. See 
Minnesota v. Andersen, 2001 Minn. App. Lexis 1346 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) 
(prohibiting defendant’s withdrawal of her plea agreement in spite of the fact 
that her plea was conditioned on the district court’s belief that she would not 
have to register as a predatory offender). 
237 In re Reed, 663 P.2d 216, 220 n.7 (Cal. 1983) (holding that California’s 
registration requirement constituted cruel and unusual punishment). 
238 Eric Lichtblau, Ashcroft Limiting Prosecutors’ Use of Plea Bargains, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2003 (noting Attorney General John Ashcroft’s efforts to 
restrict the ability of federal prosecutors to strike plea bargains in response to the 
“dangerously lenient practices” of certain federal prosecutors and judges). 
CEGLIANMACRO.DOC 4/23/2004  12:58 PM 
886 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
requirements as if he were convicted of the sexual offense. 
V.  RECOMMENDATION 
To comport with procedural and substantive due process, 
Minnesota’s Predatory Offender Registration Statute should be 
reformed to provide offenders who have never been convicted of 
an enumerated sexual offense with a hearing to challenge inclusion 
on a sex offender registry. 
“When protected liberty interests are implicated, the right to 
some kind of hearing is paramount.”239 This procedural protection 
was denied to Mr. Gunderson.240 Providing courts with the 
authority to make discretionary determinations regarding 
registration, ensures that the predatory offender registry is limited 
to those offenders whose inclusion is necessary to promote public 
safety. Given the predominance of plea bargaining, prosecutors 
often dismiss sexual offense charges to secure a plea bargain on a 
lesser charge.241 Nonetheless, registration as a sex offender is 
required although the sexual assault charges have never been 
adjudicated.242 Minnesota’s unique “arises out of the same set of 
circumstances” provision mandates that a defendant charged with 
an enumerated felony and subsequently convicted of any crime, 
even a mere misdemeanor, must register as a predatory offender.243 
If a court deems that an offender’s conviction has “arisen out of the 
same set of circumstances” as a charged predatory offense, 
registration should not be compulsory; instead it should be 
                                                          
239 Neal, 131 F.3d at 830. 
240 Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639 (8th Cir. 2003). 
241 See State v. Johnson, 2000 Minn. App. LEXIS 323 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2000). The defendant was charged with one count of first-degree criminal sexual 
conduct and one count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. Id. at *2. In 
exchange for his guilty plea to a charge of promotion of prostitution by fraud, 
the defendant received a stayed sentence and his sexual assault charges were 
dropped. Id. at *3. 
242 Id. See also Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639 (8th Cir. 2003); Neal v. 
Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818 (9th Cir. 1997); Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711 
(Minn. 1999). 
243 Logan, supra note 5, at 1333. 
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imposed at the court’s discretion. Therefore, all defendants who 
have not been convicted of an enumerated predatory offense must 
be provided with a hearing to contest their classification as a 
predatory offender.244 At this hearing, the defendant should be 
provided with an opportunity to call witnesses and present 
evidence to defend against the charge that his offense arose from 
the same set of circumstances as a charged predatory offense.245 
Additionally, in determining whether to require registration, the 
court should consider the offender’s criminal history, his risk of re-
offense, the circumstances surrounding the charged sexual offense, 
whether registration would promote public safety, and any other 
relevant evidence.246 Finally, the burden should be on the state to 
prove that the offense for which the defendant was convicted of 
arose out of the same set of circumstances as a charged predatory 
offense. 
This procedural reform would not disturb the defendant’s 
underlying conviction,247 but rather, would enable the trier of fact 
to consider individualized circumstances when deciding whether to 
impose registration obligations. For example, Gunderson never 
admitted to any charges of criminal sexual conduct and extensive 
physical evidence demonstrated a lack of sexual contact between 
the defendant and the complainant.248 Therefore, if the court were 
sufficiently convinced that the predatory offense did not occur, it 
could not be said that Gunderson’s ultimate conviction arose out of 
an enumerated predatory offense, and the court could exempt 
Gunderson from the registration obligations.249 Therefore, a 
                                                          
244 See discussion sufra Part III.A.3 (discussing procedural due process 
protections owed to sex offender registrants). 
245 Neal, 131 F.3d at 831 n.14. 
246 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6 § 178K (2)(d) (2004). See also Dep’t of 
Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 10 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that 
Connecticut permits courts to exempt certain sex offenders from registration and 
notification requirements of the statute). 
247 State v. Pierce, 794 A.2d 1123, 1133 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002). 
248 Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639, 641 (8th Cir. 2003). 
249 For example, in Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711, 713 (Minn. 1999), 
the defendant admitted to police that he had forcible sexual intercourse with the 
victim, stating that “she said she didn’t want to and I still did it I guess.” Id. 
Presumably, it was only because the victim recanted her accusations of criminal 
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discretionary hearing safeguards the due process rights of 
defendants while promoting the law’s primary goals—“keeping 
track of predatory offenders and protecting public safety.”250 
Reform of Minnesota’s registration statute through the addition 
of an opportunity for a hearing is in accord with the greater degree 
of procedural protection already afforded by other states that 
mandate registration for general categories of behavior that exceed 
specifically enumerated offenses.251 For example, in California, if 
a court orders the registration of an offender because it finds the 
offense was committed as a result of sexual compulsion or sexual 
gratification, the court must state on the record the reasons for its 
findings and the reasons for requiring registration.252 In Kansas, 
while registration may be imposed on defendants whose offenses 
were sexually motivated, the court must determine beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the crime was in fact sexually motivated.253 
A reform in the statutory scheme that would allow courts 
discretion in imposing registration requirements is also consistent 
with recent judicial trends. For example, a New York court 
recently held that where an individual is charged with a 
registerable offense that does not contain a sexual element, a 
decision concerning registration should be left to the discretion of 
the courts. A defendant is provided a hearing to determine if his 
                                                          
sexual conduct that Boutin was able to plead guilty to the charge of third-degree 
assault. Id. Therefore, in this instance, it is conceivable that Boutin’s ultimate 
conviction for assault arose out of the same set of circumstances as an 
enumerated predatory offense. Id. 
250 Judie Zollar, Predatory Offender Registration, House Research, 
Minnesota House of Representatives, Predatory Offender Registration (2002), 
available at http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/issinfo/ssporeg.pdf. 
251 CAL. PENAL CODE § 290(a)(2)(E) (Deering 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 
22-4902(c)(14) (2002); W. VA. CODE § 15-12-2(c) (2003). 
252 CAL. PENAL CODE § 290(a)(2)(E) (Deering 2004). 
253 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4902(c)(14) (2002). See W. VA. CODE § 15-12-
2(c) (2003) (while the statute mandates registration if the crime was sexually 
motivated, the sentencing judge must make a written finding that the offense 
was sexually motivated). See Pierce, 794 A.2d at 1128 (noting that under 
Connecticut’s sex offender registration statute, if the defendant is required to 
register because the court finds that his crime was committed for a felony 
purpose, the decision to require registration is discretionary). 
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crime had a sexual element. 254 
CONCLUSION 
“The touchstone of due process is the protection of the 
individual against arbitrary action of the government.”255 Due 
process is denied when an individual who has not been convicted 
of a predatory offense is labeled a predatory offender and then 
denied an opportunity to challenge his inclusion on a predatory 
offender registry.256 Sex offender registration laws such as 
Minnesota’s continue to enjoy overwhelming popular support 
given the societal condemnation of sex offenders and the fear 
engendered by their actions.257 In order for such laws to be 
constitutional, however, they must recognize the rights of those 
who fall prey to them. While it has been said that “it is a fair 
summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have 
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice 
people,” individuals required to register under Minnesota’s 
Predatory Offender Registration Statute are nevertheless entitled to 
both procedural and substantive due process as provided by the 
Constitution.258 
Given the heavy burdens imposed on registrants under 
Minnesota’s Predatory offender registration statute, offenders like 
Gunderson who have never been convicted of a sexual offense 
                                                          
254 People v. Bell, No. 3610-80, 2003 N.Y. Misc. Lexis 884, at *34 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. June 30, 2003) (holding that where classification as a sex offender is 
mandatory but the crime itself does not contain a sexual element, the defendant 
must be afforded a hearing to determine if his crime had a sexual component). 
See also State v. Reine, 2003 Ohio 50, ¶ 22 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (holding that 
mandatory classification of certain offenses as sexually-oriented, which do not 
contain a sexual element, is unreasonable). 
255 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) (noting that prisoners 
were entitled to procedural due process protections in disciplinary proceedings 
that could result in the forfeiture of their good-time credits). 
256 See discussion sufra Part II.A.3. 
257 FARKAS, supra note 212, at 166-67. 
258 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting) (dissenting from the majority’s holding that reasonable searches 
conducted without a search warrant pursuant to an arrest were permissible). 
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should be provided with a hearing to challenge their classification 
as a predatory offender. At the hearing, the burden must be on the 
State to demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that the crime 
the defendant was convicted of did in fact arise out of the same set 
of circumstances as the charged sexual offense. Additionally, the 
State must make clear what governmental interests are furthered by 
labeling an individual who has never been convicted of a sexual 
offense a predatory offender. While ensuring that children do not 
fall prey to violent sexual predators is of the utmost importance, if 
states continue to mandate registration of alleged sexual predators 
without regard to the reality of the offense, American 
jurisprudence will become the predator and the rights of potentially 
innocent offenders will become the prey. 
 
